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Abstract 
The importance of securing the cyberspace is higher than ever along with the evolution 
of cyber attacks launched by hackers with malicious intention. However, there has been 
little research to understand the hackers who are the most important agents 
determining the landscape of information security. This paper investigates the 
behaviors of hackers using a longitudinal dataset of defacement attacks. Based on 
theories of economics of criminal behaviors and variety seeking, we find that hackers 
seek variety in choosing their victims in terms of region, hacking method, and the type 
of operating systems; as their prior experience is focused in terms of hacking methods, 
target regions or operating systems, they tend to launch more attacks using new 
hacking methods, or against targets in new regions or using new operating systems. 
Furthermore, hackers are more likely to seek variety as the time interval between the 
previous and the current attack becomes longer. 
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Introduction 
The importance of securing the cyberspace is higher than ever along with the evolution of cyber attacks. 
Businesses incur huge financial losses due to security incidents every year. An FBI/McAfee study 
estimates that the cost of cybercrimes to the US economy is over 400 billion dollars, which is equivalent to 
3.4 % of its GDP (cf. Cardoso 2007). Many companies have faced multiple very sophisticated attacks 
including “advanced persistent threat (APT)” that is launched by a highly capable group to target a 
specific victim effectively over a long period of time (CSI 2011).  
As the Internet plays a more prominent role in our economy, persistent threats would become the main 
security issue in many organisations. Computer hackers would be the key actor in the majority of security 
incidents including APT. However, due to the anonymity of computer hackers, there has been little 
research on their behaviour and preferences (Karnow 1994; Van Beveren 2001) understanding of which 
will serve as an important ground for effective policy and decision making by governments and 
organizations. Mahmood et al. (2010) emphasize, “we are at arm’s length from black hat motivations 
and future dark plans.” A lack of black hat studies has also left the rich theories in criminology and 
psychology largely unexploited and untested in understanding hackers’ behaviors. Furthermore, given the 
persistency of attacks launched by the same attacker over time, an empirical study of the behavior of 
hackers in a longitudinal setting is imperative.  
Defacement is one type of security attack whereby a hacker replaces the appearance of a website or a 
webpage by breaking into the hosting server. Previously, most defacement incidents were concentrated on 
websites of individuals or smaller companies. However, as more and more “important” websites are being 
defaced in recent years, defacement poses a significant threat to organizations. For example, Twitter and 
Baidu were hijacked by "Iranian Cyber Army" in December 2009 and January 2010, respectively. The FBI 
job website was defaced in October 2009. Microsoft’s website had been defaced multiple times.  Zone-h 
recently reported that 1.5 million websites were defaced in 2010. 
Using data on defacement attacks spanning several years, this paper studies the variety seeking behaviors 
of hackers. In particular, we study why hackers may repeatedly select similar or dissimilar targets in terms 
of the targets’ regions or operating systems, and the hacking methods that they use over time.  We find 
that hackers are more likely to seek variety in choosing their victims in terms of region, hacking method, 
and the type of operating systems; as their prior experience is focused in terms of hacking methods, target 
regions or operating systems, they tend to launch more attacks using new hacking methods, or against 
targets in new regions or using new operating systems. Furthermore, hackers are more likely to seek 
variety as the time interval between the previous and the current attack becomes longer.  
This paper contributes to the literature on information security in the following ways. First, to the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines a choice made by hackers in a longitudinal setting. 
Second, we show that hackers choose their victims in the spirit of variety seeking. Although it may be 
more efficient for hackers to focus on certain types of victims due to economies of learning, we find that 
hackers do seek variety in terms of the profiles of victims, perhaps because they become satiated with the 
targets that they previously attacked. The variety seeking behavior hints that psychic benefit of 
committing cybercrime may change even in the short run, which has been implicitly suggested in the 
criminology literature (Clark and Davis 1995).  
Theoretical Backgrounds 
The rational choice theory in criminology serves as an overarching framework to understand the cost and 
benefit components of a hacker’ rational decision. The literature on consumer’s variety seeking behaviors 
in marketing, psychology and economics will help on refining specific cost and benefit components that 
affect the hacker’s behaviors to seek variety in the context of information security.  
Criminology Theory 
The literature in criminology suggests that criminals make rational decisions before committing an illegal 
activity (Becker 1968; Clark and Davis 1995; Kshetri 2006; Png et al. 2006). A criminal would analyze the 
cost and benefit of committing the crime or selecting a target.  The attractiveness of a target is one of the 
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factors that constitutes the benefit in the cost-benefit analysis. An attractive target would possess a high 
perceived value to the hacker in terms of tangible, iconic or reprisal value (Clarke 1999; Tonry and 
Farirington 1995). Based on the criminology literature (Becker 1968; Clark and Davis 1995), Kshetri 
(2010) suggests a conceptual framework in which a hacker commits a cybercrime if  
Mb + Pb > Ocp + OcmPaPc      (1) 
where Mb = monetary benefit of committing the crime; Pb = psychic benefit of committing the crime; Ocp = 
psychic costs of committing a cybercrime, such as the fear or apprehension of punishment; Ocm = 
monetary opportunity costs of conviction; Pa = the probability of arrest; Pc = the probability of conviction.  
Although simple, the framework provides a useful insight to understanding a hackers’ incentive to commit 
hacking attacks over time. More and more hackers today are motivated by financial incentives (Kaspersky 
2005).  For example, an IT graduate in Romania may earn around $ 400 per month whereas he may be 
able to make several thousand dollars per months by engaging in the cybercrime economy (Claburn 
2008). Psychic benefits can be explained by intrinsic motivation of hackers (Kshetri 2006). Such benefits 
include fun and testing their skills. Psychic costs include apprehension of punishment, guilt, and mental 
energy. In fact, penetrating into computer systems may require a large amount of domain knowledge, 
effort, and time. However, the widespread hacking tools available on the internet have made hacking 
possible even for amateurs without sophisticated knowledge about hacking. The last term in equation (1) 
captures any foregone monetary income by being arrested and serving a criminal sentence.  
In addition to hackers’ incentives, few studies (Sim 2005; Van Beveren 2001; Young et al. 2007) in the 
information security literature have examined hackers’ behavioral motivations. However, it is notable that 
these studies rely primarily on survey data instead of observing actual hacking behaviors. 
Variety Seeking Behaviors 
Variety seeking has been studied extensively in marketing, psychology, and microeconomics (Givon 1984; 
Kahn 1995; McAlister and Pessemier 1982; Sajeesh and Raju 2010; Seetharaman and Che 2009; Wang 
and Goh 2012). Variety seeking is an individual’s tendency of try out a wide variety of products. In 
marketing and psychology, the variety seeking behavior can be motivated by three factors which are 
satiation/stimulation, external situation, and future preference uncertainty (Givon 1984; Kahn 1995; 
McAlister and Pessemier 1982; Sajeesh and Raju 2010).  
Prior research has documented that satiation and stimulation, as intrapersonal motives, may cause the 
direct variety seeking behavior (Kahn 1995; McAlister and Pessemier 1982). For instance, individuals 
would seek variety to avoid boredom. The drivers of variety seeking are not limited to the needs and 
availability of resources. In addition, McGuire (1976) has also suggested the need of novelty as a 
psychological motivation for variety seeking. There is a relationship between variety seeking behavior and 
the level of stimulation received from novelty, complexity, incongruity and changes. Furthermore, 
whenever stimulation drops below the satisfactory level, cognitive action will cause individuals to engage 
in exploratory and variety seeking behavior.  
Other than an internal desire for variety, a change in external situations may also lead to an individual’s 
variety seeking behavior as a response to the change. The situation that dictates variety seeking behaviors 
may include changes in the set of feasible alternatives, changes in tastes, or changes in the constraints 
facing the individual (McAlister and Pessemier 1982).  
Hypotheses Development 
Based on the theories on rational choice and variety seeking, we expect that a hacker’s prior experience 
may discount its net benefit derived from ongoing attacks. Further, hackers’ variety seeking intention may 
differ from that of consumers in the following aspects. First, consumers’ purchase benefits both 
themselves and vendors, but hackers’ attack induces loss to victims. Second, consumers seek variety for 
fun or stimulation from the psychological perspective, or due to diminishing marginal benefit from the 
economic perspective. However, criminals seek variety because of diminishing returns from the same 
victim, to reduce the risk of being arrested, or to avoid more stringent penalty to recurring crimes. 
Another possible reason is from the strategic response of victims. Note all of these will affect the cost and 
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benefit components in Equation (1). Although hacking experience may drive down a hacker’s cost to 
attack the same victim, the marginal cost to attack the same victim may rise as the victim becomes more 
alert and enhances its protection measures. Unlike the research on consumer behavior where surveys and 
experiments can be carried out to measure consumers’ perceived benefit and cost from repeat purchases, 
hacker communities are mostly underground. However, observations on hackers’ prior choices of victims 
and time intervals between attacks may help us predict or infer the hacker’s variety seeking intention. 
Concentration of Prior Experience 
Ransbotham and Mitra (2009) argue that a cyber attack may not be a single event; cyber attacks are often 
interdependent on each other and can be part of the whole information security compromise process.  We 
conceptualize that a hackers’ decision to seek variety in terms of the type of victims is affected by his prior 
experience. As discussed above, the literature on variety seeking suggests that individuals may get bored 
of the same product after repeatedly consuming it (Kahn 1995; McAlister and Pessemier 1982). In the 
framework given in (1) above, psychic benefit (Pb) from fun, excitement, and enjoyment decreases as a 
hacker’s experience is concentrated in certain types of victims. Therefore, we expect that hackers are likely 
to seek variety when there is a higher concentration of prior experience. 
Furthermore, there exists an additional reason to prescribe more variety seeking activities when hackers’ 
prior experience is concentrated. Hackers look for an opportunity to test and learn new skills through 
exercises. As the learning literature suggests, the marginal benefit of learning by doing diminishes as an 
individual accumulates more and more experience (Argote and Epple 1990). Therefore, a victim of the 
same kind becomes less attractive when a hacker’s prior experience is concentrated, which may trigger 
variety seeking.  
Each country or region would have their unique characteristic such as IT infrastructure, regulation for 
information security, and awareness of information security (Kshetri 2010). These characteristics 
determine the difficulties of penetrating into systems and the way attacks are made. A hacker who 
repeatedly attacks the same region would get very familiar with the characteristics and become proficient 
with it. Thus, the challenge for attacking the website would be reduced. That is, the perceived benefit (i.e. 
enjoyment, excitement, and gain in knowledge) from attacking the same region will decrease, and thus a 
hacker will be more likely to seek variety by attacking a new region. We hypothesize: 
• Hypothesis 1a: A hacker is more likely to seek variety in terms of victim’s region as their prior 
experience is more concentrated in particular regions. 
Every operating system has its own characteristics including system facilities, vulnerabilities, design 
flaws, and architecture. Every operating system will require hackers to use different exploit and tools to 
initiate an attack (Arora et al. 2010; Arora et al. 2008; Ozment 2005). Targeting the same system 
constantly may cause a hacker to become satiated, and thus the hacker may need to seek variety to achieve 
the state of arousal. Attacking the same type of systems would offer fewer opportunities to test new skills, 
and thus variety seeking would be stimulated. We hypothesize: 
• Hypothesis 1b: A hacker is more likely to seek variety in terms of victim’s operating system as their 
prior experience is more concentrated in particular operating systems. 
Hackers can employ different hacking methods such as SQL injection, server intrusion, and brute force 
attacks, when they compromise systems. All these different methods of attack require different techniques 
and skill sets. Similar to the case of operating systems, each attack method would use different exploit, 
tools and tasks. Repeatedly applying the same method would cause a hacker to feel bored eventually, and 
thus the hacker would want to seek variety to gain enjoyment from the novelty of new attack methods. 
Boredom would reduce the perceived benefits; in contrast, variety seeking would increase the learning 
benefit from novelty. We hypothesize: 
• Hypothesis 1c: A hacker is more likely to seek variety in terms of the methods of hacking as their prior 
experience is more concentrated in particular methods of hacking. 
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Inter-attack Time Interval 
The prior literature has shown that variety seeking behaviors may be resulted from an individual’s 
response to changes in external situations. In the context of cyber attacks, the fast-moving information 
technology may make changes in the characteristics of alternative victims, changes in the set of feasible 
hacking techniques, or changes in the constraints facing a hacker.  These external forces may drive down a 
hacker’s perceived net benefit from repeatedly attacking victims possessing similar characteristics, and 
hence increase the likelihood of varied behavior. For instance, after a certain period of time since a hacker 
has made an attack, the vulnerabilities may be patched up in the system updates, and other vulnerabilities 
will be discovered and addressed. The patches will stop the attacker from using the exploit found on that 
particular operating system. The patches may also stop hackers from using the same attack methods 
because the vulnerabilities have been removed. Ozment and Schechter (2006) have suggested that 
frequent patching of the system has diminished the number of vulnerabilities found in the system in the 
long run (Ozment and Schechter 2006). Likewise, after a period of time, policy makers or managers will 
introduce new policy and regulation which would affect the IT infrastructure, security regulation, and 
security awareness.  
It is notable that a hacker can accumulate knowledge about attacking systems in specific regions, 
compromising specific types of operating systems, and applying a certain types of hacking methods. While 
attacking a victim possessing the same characteristics as previous victims may be less costly due to 
learning, the changes in external environments mentioned above may make hackers more difficult to 
launch an attack by applying the same techniques as before. Taken together, as the time elapsed between 
the prior attack and the current attack, prior knowledge gained by cumulative experience becomes 
obsolete. Thus, a hacker is less constrained by his prior experience and free to seek variety at the similar 
cost to attacking previously acquainted regions and systems with familiar hacking methods.  
Furthermore, learning occurs when the same tasks are repeatedly performed (Argote and Epple 1990), 
but individuals may forget the knowledge that they learned previously. Forgetting is facilitated especially 
when the task is not being carried out for a long time (Darr et al. 1995). The amount of knowledge 
forgotten in the task would depend on the time elapsed (Bailey 1989; Teyarachakul et al. 2011). Again, the 
productivity gain by prior experience is less binding, which leads to more variety seeking behaviors. Based 
on the discussions, we hypothesize: 
• Hypothesis 2a: A hacker is more likely to seek variety in terms of region as the time elapsed since his 
previous attack becomes longer. 
• Hypothesis 2b: A hacker is more likely to seek variety in terms of operating systems as the time 
elapsed since his previous attack becomes longer. 
• Hypothesis 2c: A hacker is more likely to seek variety in terms of the method of hacking as the time 
elapsed since his previous attack becomes longer. 
Research Methodology 
Data Collection 
We collected our data from Zone-h.org. Zone-h is a privately owned website that archives defaced 
websites based on defacers’ self-report. Typically, once a hacker defaces a website, it notifies Zone-h about 
the details of the defacement incident through the Zone-h webpage.  The reported information includes 
the URL of the defaced website, the reason for defacements (e.g., for fun, for political reasons, to be a best 
defacer, etc.), the hacking method (e.g., SQL injection, known vulnerability, etc.), the type of victim’s 
operating systems (e.g., Linux, Solaris, Win XP, MacOS, etc.), and the notifier identity. The reasons for 
defacements, mode of hacking, and the operating systems types are chosen by a notifying hacker unit 
from drop-down lists that were pre-defined by Zone-h.org. The Zone-h’s web server automatically 
captures the defaced webpage at the time of report. The captured webpage is manually verified by Zone-
h’s staff to rule out fake reports.  
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The original data collected from Zone-h contains 3,545,153 observations of 30,627 hacking units collected 
in the period from 29 February 2000 to 9 April 2010. To capture the data of the latest hacker behavior, we 
included only the hackers who joined in the most recent five years. Considering that a single server may 
host more than one website, defacement attacks that are made to the same IP address by the same hacker 
within 24 hours are considered mass defacementon a web server and counted as a single attack. In order 
to study the dynamics of choices over a certain period of time, we sampled the first 30 defacements since 
the hacking unit has made three defacements. That is, a sequence of 30 attacks from the 4th attack was 
included. This procedure is to make sure that the concentration of prior defacements can be properly 
coded. We finally had 1,946 unique hacker units in our dataset.  
Variables Measurement 
We construct three dependent variables related to variety seeking behaviors: variety seeking in terms 
region, operating systems, and hacking methods. The variety seeking variables are generated based on 
prior experience of the attacker. 0 is assigned if the attacker has any prior experience with a certain 
attribute (region, operating system, and hacking method) of the current defacement attack; 1 indicates 
that the attacker had no prior experience with the attribute of the current defacement attack. For example, 
if a hacker had defaced 10 websites hosted in North America and Europe and has just defaced a website in 
Europe again, his variety seeking in terms of region will be coded as zero; his variety seeking variables will 
be coded as one if he defaces a website hosted in Asia. In the dataset, there are six possible regions for a 
defaced website including North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia. The regions 
were identified by matching the victim’s IP addresses with the IP geolocation data obtained from 
MaxMind. Similarly, there are 39 and 29 different types of operating systems and hacking methods that 
can be chosen by a hacker from a drop-down list in Zone-h.  
We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the concentration in prior experience 
(Herfindahl 1950; Hirschman 1945). HHI is commonly used to measure the concentration in an industry, 
but is also often applied in other contexts. For example, the HHI of prior experience in terms of region is 
∑ ==
N
j
jSonRegioniConcentrat
1
2  where N is the number of categories (i.e., regions) and sj is the share of  
region category  j in prior attacks. Two other concentration variables (ConcentrationOS and 
ConcentrationMode) are coded in the same way.  
The inter-attack time since last attack (InterAttackTime) is calculated by counting the number of days 
between the last and the current attack. We take logarithms to reflect a diminishing effect.  
We include other control variables such as age, a set of dummies for calendar years (y2005-y2009), 
concentration in prior defacements in terms of reasons (ConcentrationReason), a set of dummies 
indicating different motivations for defacements (Reason1-Reason6) and log of the number of prior 
defacements made by the same hacker unit (LogPriorExperience). Age is calculated by the number of 
years elapsed since the first defacement attack made by the hacker until the current defacement attack. 
Reason 1  through Reason 6 indicate “As a challenge,” “Heh...just for fun!,” “I just want to be the best 
defacer,” “Patriotism,” “Political reasons,” and “Revenge against that website.” The reason is unknown for 
some defacements and not recorded in the dataset. The variable for concentration of reasons in prior 
attacks is calculated using HHI. In addition to controlling for different motivations that hackers carry, we 
also control for a general stock of experience that a hacker unit possesses by LogPriorExperience. In the 
learning literature, log of the number of cumulative experience is frequently used to account for the effect 
of prior experience (Argote and Epple 1990). This variable also controls for a possible reduction in the 
choice set as they gain more experience and fewer choices are left for variety seeking. 
Model Development 
Since the dependent variables have discrete binary values, the classical linear regression would not be 
suitable in analyzing this model. Instead, a panel logit model would be appropriate (Greene 2007). The 
probability density of variety seeking in terms of category k in the t-th defacement by hacker unit i is  
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where k = Mode}OS,{Region,  represents a type of variety seeking ; kiα  captures unobserved hacker-
specific fixed effects; and 
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For variety seeking in terms of operating systems and hacking methods, itgionReionConcentrat  is simply 
replaced with itionOSConcentrat  and itionModeConcentrat , respectively. We use the fixed effects logit model 
for estimation. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic of Variables for the First 30 observations per Hacker Unit 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
VS
Region
 64,421 0.050 0.219 0.000 1.000 
VS
OS
 64,421 0.056 0.231 0.000 1.000 
VS
Mode
 64,421 0.114 0.317 0.000 1.000 
ConcentrationRegion 64,421 0.586 0.196 0.200 1.000 
ConcentrationOS 64,421 0.680 0.204 0.160 1.000 
ConcentrationMode 64,421 0.550 0.305 0.066 1.000 
InterAttackTime 64,421 0.640 1.007 0.000 7.287 
LogPriorExperience 64,421 2.695 0.636 1.099 3.466 
ConcentrationReason 64,421 0.643 0.278 0.143 1.000 
Reason1 64,421 0.135 0.342 0.000 1.000 
Reason2 64,421 0.317 0.465 0.000 1.000 
Reason3 64,421 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 
Reason4 64,421 0.186 0.389 0.000 1.000 
Reason5 64,421 0.075 0.264 0.000 1.000 
Reason6 64,421 0.089 0.285 0.000 1.000 
Age 64,421 0.078 0.348 0.000 4.000 
y2005 64,421 0.104 0.306 0.000 1.000 
y2006 64,421 0.304 0.460 0.000 1.000 
y2007 64,421 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 
y2008 64,421 0.196 0.397 0.000 1.000 
y2009 64,421 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000 
Estimation Results 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables are shown in Table 1. The preliminary results are presented 
in table 2. The coefficients for dummy variables on reasons and years have been omitted for brevity. The 
results show that the hypotheses are well supported. The three equations for variety seeking in terms of 
region, operating systems, and hacking methods have the pseudo R2 of around 0.15, 0.10 and 0.10.  
All the concentration variables testing Hypothesis 1a to 1c have significant and positive effects on each 
type of variety seeking. For region variety seeking, the concentration of region in prior attacks 
(ConcentrationRegion) has a coefficient of 6.81; For operating systems variety seeking, the concentration 
of operating systems in prior attacks (ConcentrationOS) has a coefficient of 5.64;  For variety seeking in 
hacking methods, the concentration of hacking methods (ConcentrationMode) has a coefficient of 2.21.  
For all three models, we find a positive and significant effect of the inter-attack time since last attack 
(InterAttackTime). Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses. 
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It is also notable that some dummy variables for reasons were significant in our results. Interestingly, 
hackers are least variety seeking when they deface as a challenge (Reason 1); they are least variety seeking 
in terms of hacking method when they deface due to patriotism (Reason 4); they are least variety seeking 
in terms of operating systems when they deface for fun (Reason 2).  
As a robustness check, the model was re-estimated using a sequence of 50 observations (instead of 30). 
We have confirmed that the estimation of 50 observations shows similar results compared to the 
estimation with a sequence of 30 observations.  
Table 2.  Estimation Results 
Variables Hypothesis 
Region Variety 
Seeking 
System Variety 
Seeking 
Hacking Method 
Variety Seeking 
ConcentrationRegion H1a 
6.808*** 
(0 .197) 
  
ConcentrationOS H1b  
5.639*** 
(0.168) 
 
ConcentrationMode H1c   
2.210*** 
(0.134) 
InterAttackTime H2a-H2c 
0.171*** 
(0 .019) 
0.186 *** 
(0.016) 
0.340 *** 
(0.013) 
LogPriorExperience  
-0.163*** 
(0.036) 
-0.222*** 
(0.030) 
-0.792*** 
(0.024) 
ConcentrationReason  
-0.131 
(0.167) 
-0.370* 
(0.148) 
-1.191*** 
(0.134) 
Age  
0.053 
(0.153) 
0.024 
(0.132) 
-0.030 
(0.093) 
Number of Observations  53,717 58,280 52,162 
Number of Hacker Units  1,792 1,946 1,740 
Log likelihood  -8327.2191 -11130.008 -14941.828 
Pseudo R
2
  0.148 0.099 0.100 
Significant at 1 % ***, 5 % **, and 10% *. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Discussion and Implication 
While it may appear more efficient to hack systems with prior experience, our study suggests that hackers 
do seek variety in terms of the profiles of their victims. It may appear more cost-effective to invest 
resources to protect their systems against more prevalent attacks and hackers. However, our study implies 
that decision makers in organizations and policy makers have to secure their systems against a more 
diverse set of hackers from different regions and backgrounds. Our findings highlight to managers and 
policy maker the importance of re-evaluating and revising the information security policy on a regular 
basis against hackers whose attack patterns are different from previously known ones. Furthermore, the 
variety seeking behavior hints that psychic benefit of committing cybercrime may change even in the short 
run, which has been implicitly suggested in the criminology literature (Clark and Davis 1995). 
Our results on Hypothesis 2 indicate that hackers tend to engage in variety seeking after stopping for a 
long period of time. The main interest of policy makers is to deter hackers from making further attacks 
possibly by enforcing stricter regulations. Our finding suggests that if a hacker is not completely deterred 
and comes back after a certain period of time, it may become more difficult to identify and apprehend the 
hacker as the pattern of attacks may be different from previous ones. For example, hackers often leave 
their “signature” behind, which can be used in matching with previously known hackers.  
One important limitation of our study is that the data are self-reported by hackers, and the accuracy of 
our results may be sensitive to any omitted reports. However, we believe that the data are reasonably 
accurate in that hackers conducting defacements report to Zone-h.org primarily to show off their skills 
and success. Our future model will address such a bias using the Heckman correction. In addition, our 
binary dependent variable to measure variety seeking may be limited in capturing every aspect of variety 
seeking behavior. 
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This study develops and conducts a preliminary test of a theoretical model that explains the variety 
seeking behaviors by hackers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to examine a choice 
made by hackers in a longitudinal setting. We expect that this research would shed some light in 
understanding the behavior of hackers and their decision making. In the future, we plan to extend this 
research by identifying other factors that determine hackers’ variety seeking while conducting more 
robustness checks. We will also extend our work to study the motivations of variety seeking. For example, 
variety seeking in regions may be more related to boredom than variety seeking in hacking methods which 
may be more influenced by learning benefits.   
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